III. THE CRISIS AT THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Criticism of the Commission has intensified in recent years, focusing particularly on its ineffectiveness, its reduced credibility and its inability to respond to the real challenges currently facing the world in the field of human rights. These criticisms have been leveled both by member and non-member states of the Commission, by NGOs, and by individuals working within the UN. Criticism has come from both developed and developing countries. The list of accusations naturally differs depending on the regional bloc voicing the criticism.  However, there are certain key flaws that are primarily responsible for the current crisis within the Commission. These problems can be summarized as: a) membership; b) politicization, selectivity and double standards; and c) weakened infrastructure.

a) Membership

The Commission’s current membership includes some of the countries with the worst human rights record in the world. These countries have recently become aware of the Commission’s importance, the media attention it receives, and the damage done to their image and reputation whenever the Commission adopts resolutions condemning them or drawing attention to the violations they commit. While it is true that the Commission’s decisions are political and non-binding and that they lack a clear mechanism for implementation, a country’s reputation is still negatively affected when it is criticized by the Commission during its annual session. This process is known as “naming and shaming.” Indeed, it is by bringing the world’s attention to the worst human rights violations, and by pressuring the governments responsible to remedy the situation in order to avoid embarrassment, that the Commission plays its most effective and valuable role. 

In order to evade international scrutiny and condemnation, the states known for repeated violations of their citizens’ rights have resorted to two tactics: firstly, these states attempt to downsize and limit the important role played by the Commission (a tactic pioneered and led by Egypt, as will be shown below); secondly, they exert serious efforts to secure Commission membership so that they are entitled to vote on the Commission’s decisions and thereby avoid criticism. Whereas the Commission’s membership was originally limited to the UN member states most concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights, it has now mutated into a list of governments whose only concern is to protect themselves from any form of monitoring of their human rights record. These states consequently forestall any serious discussion of the most important and pressing human rights issues, and limit the Commission’s independence and ability to prevent and respond effectively to human rights violations.

Sudan’s membership in the Commission, concurrent with the escalation of the Darfur massacres of civilians, was one of the most notable manifestations of the Commission’s membership crisis. Sudan’s membership continued even after the release of the UN international fact-finding mission’s report that accused the Sudanese government of committing acts that may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Security Council referred the Darfur case to the International Criminal Court. Yet, during the 2004 and 2005 sessions, the only concern of a number of the Commission’s members, and especially Egypt, was to prevent the Commission from issuing a condemnation directed at the Sudanese government – or, at the very least, to tone down and weaken any condemnation that was successful. As a result, the Commission failed to take the type of action warranted by the level of human disaster suffered in Darfur.

Similarly, a glance at the list of the fifty-three Commission member countries for 2005 is sufficient to make clear the problems surrounding membership. In addition to Sudan, the member list includes, for example, China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe – all countries with severe human rights problems.

b) Politicization, Selectivity and Double Standards

One of the results of the Commission’s membership crisis is that its deliberations and resolutions are influenced more by political considerations than by human rights values or the desire to protect victims of gross violations.  It came as no surprise, for example, that China refused to support a decision condemning wide-ranging crimes of forced ‘disappearances’ committed by Russian forces in Chechnya, in exchange for Russia’s refusal to support a resolution condemning China’s deplorable human rights record.²

The Commission has consistently failed over the past few years to introduce or pass resolutions on human rights issues in Zimbabwe, China, Iran or Russia. It has also become normal practice for some countries to exploit administrative shortcomings in order to end discussion of the most important human rights issues. Overall, it is the smaller states that come under scrutiny – states with insufficient geopolitical influence to persuade the rest of the members to turn a blind eye to their practices. The criteria by which countries are assessed or condemned are therefore dictated more by a country’s size and influence than by its record of human rights violations.

For example, during the Commission’s 2005 session, the issue of the treatment of Iraqi prisoners failed to appear on the Commission’s agenda during its entire six-week meeting. This omission occurred despite the fact that it was the first time the Commission had convened after the scandal of the torture and ill-treatment of prisoners at the hands of US forces at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The resolution that would have called upon the US to open the Guantanamo Bay prison to UN inspectors to determine the treatment and legal status of prisoners received only eight out of a total of fifty-three votes. Political considerations prevented most states, including Egypt, from condemning the United States.

c ) Weakened Infrastructure

In addition to the problems listed above, the Commission suffers from structural problems that limit its ability to respond to human rights abuses. One of the most significant problems is the limited time available for the Commission: it only convenes once a year for six weeks, during which time it has on its agenda a vast and ever-increasing number of human rights issues to discuss. As a result, the time allotted to each of these important issues is grossly inadequate and does not allow for serious and thorough discussions. In addition, the fact that the Commission does not meet throughout the year, but only for six weeks in March and April, prevents it from responding to urgent crises which require an immediate response but which occur when it is not in session.

In addition to operating under a highly restricted time-frame, the Commission also suffers from a lack of resources. For example, in order to gather information about, and respond to, alleged rights violations year-round, the Commission relies upon the efforts of independent experts. The Commission appoints these independent experts who work on a voluntary basis in addition to their permanent jobs in their respective countries. The experts rely upon the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to fund their activities and to provide them with human resources and research support. However, the High Commissioner’s Office suffers from a serious lack of resources that limits its ability to provide support for experts: it receives less than 2% of the UN’s budget despite the importance accorded to human rights by the UN Charter. The reports, meetings and monitoring activities that the Commission asks the Office of the High Commissioner to prepare and fund constitute an additional drain on the High Commissioner’s already limited budget. The lack of funding undermines the independent experts’ work and weakens any subsequent monitoring of their recommendations.

These and other problems have led to a steady rise of criticism directed at the Commission and have contributed to a crisis of confidence in the institution’s capabilities.  There is now a general consensus that the current situation is untenable. This crisis has motivated various parties to prepare recommendations for reforming and improving the situation. These proposals will be discussed in the following section.

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2- See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Russia: U.N. Chechnya Vote Assailed,” (19 Apr. 2002)